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ing resources to the disadvantage of 
inmates with mental illnesses. A few 
examples include: a wait time of up to 
12 months to receive mental health 
treatment; an increased rate of suicide, 
of which an estimated 72.1% were 
deemed reasonably foreseeable and pre-
ventable had appropriate mental health 
treatment been available; and the place-
ment of inmates with mental illnesses in 
“telephone-booth sized cages” for ex-
tended periods of times due to the lack 
of treatment beds.4 In one case, an in-
mate, found catatonic and unresponsive, 
had been forced to stand in his excre-
ment for 24 hours because there was 
“no place to put him”.5 (See Picture C 
included in the majority opinion).  
      The consequences of prison over-
crowding are not simply soaring costs, 
(‘Overcrowded U.S. Prisons and Mentally Ill 
Offenders,’ Continued on page 7) 
inmates’ constitutional rights.3 The deci-
sion addresses the growing problem of 
prison overcrowding in California, as 
well as across the nation, and the impact 
overcrowding has on the provision and 
delivery of effective mental health treat-
ment in a timely fashion. It also under-
scores the need to set limits on the 
harmful environmental conditions within 
the criminal justice system. Addressing 
the issue of prison overcrowding is criti-
cal to ensure that the combination of 
sentencing policies and fiscal constraints 
do not create inhumane conditions with-
in correctional settings that ultimately 
compromise the mental health of incar-
cerated persons, and their ability to even-
tually reenter the community, in ways 
that protect the interests of society.  
      In the majority opinion, the Supreme 
Court documented examples of how 
prison overcrowding has strained exist-
entitle employees to unpaid leave if they 
provide living organ donations. This 
unpaid leave would include time for 
testing, physical and psychological eval-
uations, pre-transplant and postopera-
tive services, travel, and appropriate 
recovery time.5 Unfortunately, possibly 
due to lack of 
realization of its imperativeness and lack 
(‘Donor Leave Acts,’ Continued on page 6) 
no explicit legislation requiring public or 
private employers to give organ or bone 
marrow donor employees a compensated 
or uncompensated leave of absence. 
      Congress has responded to the need 
for donor leave acts. In 1999, Congress 
passed legislation which allows all federal 
employees to take up to thirty days a year 
of paid leave for donating organs or sev-
en days of paid leave when donating 
bone marrow.2 It further encourages that 
employers of donor employees liberally 
extend the time of paid leave.3 Leave for 
bone marrow and organ donation is con-
sidered a separate category of leave that is 
in addition to annual and sick leave.4 In 
2007, some members of Congress also 
attempted to amend the Family and Med-
ical Leave Act of 1993 with the Living 
Donor Job Security Act, which would 
Moving to a Model of Rehabili-
tation 
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      In a decision handed down on May 
23, 2011, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the inmate population 
cap of California prisons at 137.5% of 
its design capacity, which was previous-
ly imposed by a three-judge district 
court.1 Capping the inmate population 
at 137.5% was an effort to provide re-
lief to California’s overcrowded prisons, 
which were testified to be populated at 
200% of their design capacity.2 The 
court determined that the degree of 
overcrowding in California’s prisons 
was the cause of a systemic failure to 
deliver adequate physical and mental 
health care to inmates in violation of 
Protecting Employees Who 
Choose to Give the Gift of Life 
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      New Jersey should adopt state leg-
islation requiring private and public 
employers to provide a paid leave of 
absence during testing for, surgery of, 
and recovery from organ donation. 
Currently, only inadequate programs 
are in place: New Jersey has a Donated 
Leave program, which allows employ-
ees to donate up to ten sick or vacation 
days to co-workers affected by health 
issues, those caring for sick family 
members, or a co-worker who requires 
absence from work due to the donation 
of an organ.1 However, New Jersey has 
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      Imagine that seventy percent of 
Americans who take prescription medi-
cations were denied the right to sue the 
drug manufacturer for failing to ade-
quately warn of harmful side effects 
simply because they took the generic 
rather than the brand medication.1 On 
its face, this may be the reading from 
the recent Supreme Court case PLI-
VA, Inc. v. Mensing2, which held that 
state tort liability claims against generic 
drug manufacturers on failure-to-warn 
claims were preempted by federal law.3 
However, the Supreme Court left unre-
solved the issue of whether a brand 
manufacturer can be held liable for the 
injuries caused by another company’s 
generic equivalent. Thus, while one 
door has effectively been shut against 
plaintiffs harmed by prescription medi-
cations, another has been potentially 
opened. “Faced with the alternative of 
providing plaintiffs no avenue of relief, 
courts may hold innovators liable for 
all pharmaceutical injuries,” 4 even if 
the plaintiff was harmed by the generic 
company’s medication.  
      This article will first address the 
decision in PLIVA and then examine 
several other court decisions regarding 
liability of brand name and generic 
drug manufacturers. The article con-
cludes that plaintiffs should not be left 
without a remedy when harmed by a 
generic manufacturer’s medication 
based on principles of tort law and 
public policy. In light of PLIVA and 
to better protect the consumer, brand 
name drug manufacturers should be 
held accountable when they negligently 
cause harm to plaintiffs taking the ge-
neric equivalent of their product.5 While 
this article recognizes that there may be 
certain shortcomings inherent in hold-
ing brand manufactures liable, it con-
cludes that brand manufacturers should 
not escape liability merely because the 
plaintiff used the generic rather than the 
brand medication.  
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing: Generic Manu-
facturers are not Liable  
      There are two recognized forms of 
preemption under the Supremacy 
Clause.6 The first type, express preemp-
tion, occurs when Congress enacts legis-
lation that specifically reserves the area 
of law in question for federal regula-
tion.7 The second type, implied preemp-
tion, takes place under two circumstanc-
es.8 It can either occur through field 
preemption, which arises when Con-
gress legislates so comprehensively in a 
certain area of law that there is no room 
for state regulation,9 or it can arise 
through conflict preemption, which 
occurs when a state’s regulation con-
flicts with a federal law in such a way 
that it is impossible to comply with 
both.10  
      Just a few years before PLIVA, the 
Supreme Court in 2009 held that state 
failure-to-warn claims against brand 
manufacturers were not preempted 
when the plaintiff was injured by the 
brand medication.11 But, this holding did 
not prevent generic manufacturers from 
claiming preemption. The Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) regulates 
the approval of both brand and generic 
pharmaceuticals, but does so under sep-
arate statutory and regulatory provi-
sions.12 The Hatch-Waxman Act enables 
generic drug manufacturers to submit a 
smaller collection of clinical data prior 
to receiving the FDA’s approval to mar-
ket a new generic medication.13 In re-
turn, the FDA requires the generic man-
ufacturers to duplicate the labeling of 
the branded drug.14 In effect, the generic 
manufacturers forfeit all control over 
the safety and efficacy warnings of the 
generic drug and rely solely on the infor-
mation disseminated by the brand man-
ufacturers.15 With this backdrop, the 
Supreme Court then addressed the issue 
of preemption against generic manufac-
turers in PLIVA.  
      The plaintiffs in PLIVA alleged that 
they developed tardive dyskinesia, a 
severe neurological disorder, from their 
long-term use of metoclopramide, a 
generic drug commonly used to treat 
digestive tract problems.16 Additionally, 
the plaintiffs claimed that the generic 
manufacturer failed to adequately warn 
of the long-term usage risks of metoclo-
pramide, in violation of state tort law.17 
But, federal law requires a generic man-
ufacturer to ensure that its warning la-
beling is exactly the same as that of the 
brand.18 Accordingly, the issue at trial 
was whether, and to what extent, gener-
ic manufacturers could unilaterally 
change their warning labels in the ab-
sence of the brand  
(‘A Prescription for Change,’ Continued on 
page 10)  
 
“… THE SUPREME COURT LEFT 
UNRESOLVED THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER A BRAND MANUFAC-
TURER CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR 
THE INJURIES CAUSED BY AN-
OTHER COMPANY’S GENERIC 
EQUIVALENT.”  
Are they Sufficiently Enforced? 
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      On February 11, 2011, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices’ (HHS) Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR) imposed a $4.3 million dollar 
civil money penalty on Cignet Health of 
Prince George’s County, MD, for viola-
tions of the Privacy Rule of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA).1 This penalty was 
the first civil money penalty imposed by 
HSS for a Privacy Rule violation.2 In 
announcing the penalty, OCR Director 
Georgina Verdugo vowed that, “The 
U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services will continue to investigate and 
take action against those organizations 
PAGE 5 VOLUME V, ISSUE 1 
that knowingly disregard their obliga-
tions under these rules.”3  
      True to its word, HHS reached a 
settlement with the University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles Health Systems 
this past summer for potential violations 
of the Privacy Rule when “A rouge em-
ployee reportedly peeped into confiden-
tial medical files of 32 celebrities, politi-
cians and other high-profile patients…
as well as 29 noncelebrities, in 2006 and 
2007.”4 Under the terms of the settle-
ment, UCLA Health System agreed to 
pay $865,000 and has committed to a 
corrective action plan.5  
      HHS has demonstrated a recent 
willingness to investigate and take action 
against Privacy Rule violators, but its 
enforcement activities invite the ques-
tion: has the level of action taken been 
enough? Or, does HHS need to be even 
more proactive and take more wide-
spread action against potential Privacy 
Rule violators? This article begins by 
outlining the penalties available to HHS 
for Privacy Rule violations under 
HIPAA. It then considers statutorily 
created alternative options to penalties 
available to HHS and analyzes their ef-
fectiveness (or lack thereof). It con-
cludes by suggesting that HHS’ action 
thus far against Privacy Rule violators 
has been insufficient. Public policy dic-
tates that greater penalties and more 
extensive imposition of those penalties 
are necessary.6  
(‘Penalties for Federal Health Privacy Viola-
tions,’ Continued on page 7) 
Penalties for Federal Health Privacy Violations 
Punishment, Prevention, Protection and the Challenge of 
Diagnosing Mental Disorders  
ed. The current state of diagnostic pre-
cision and consistency in the mental 
health profession is an issue that relates 
directly to the interventions carried out 
by the legal system and profoundly 
impacts all involved, from judges and 
psychiatrists down to the criminal de-
fendant.  
      A diagnosis of mental disorder is 
relevant in all three models of interven-
tion: in the punishment model, one’s 
culpability may be lessened (or elimi-
nated) if a mental disorder is identified; 
in the prevention model, one’s propen-
sity toward harmful behavior is often 
judged by assessing the presence or 
absence of a mental disorder; in the 
protection model, one’s ability to func-
tion in wider society may be compro-
mised by a mental disorder.1 The diag-
nosis of a mental disorder could com-
pletely alter the course of a criminal 
defendant’s life, leading either to incar-
ceration, commitment, or acquittal. 
The centrality of mental disorder diag-
nosis, and the difficulty in obtaining an 
unassailable diagnosis, is illustrated in 
the trial of John Hinckley.2  Tried in 
1982 for the attempted assassination of 
Ronald Reagan, Hinckley pled not 
guilty by reason of insanity, claiming 
that he wanted to shoot the President 
in order to win the love of Jodie Fos-
ter.3 The  
(‘Punishment, Prevention, Protection and the 
Challenge of Diagnosing Mental Disorders,’ 
Continued on page 14) 
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      In the context of the criminal legal 
system, the government is empowered 
to intervene in the lives of its citizens 
by punishing past acts, preventing fu-
ture harm, or protecting those deemed 
unable to protect themselves. A critical 
step in these interventions is determin-
ing the mental status of the individual 
being assessed. When that individual’s 
mental capacity is called into question, 
either by the state or the individual 
himself, the presence, absence, or treat-
ability of a mental disorder is central to 
the court’s decision-making. The cen-
trality of mental disorder diagnosis 
raises many issues, especially whether 
the diagnoses themselves may be trust-
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‘Donor Leave Acts,’ Continued 
Zuckerman decided that a doctor and a 
lawyer working together gave the patients 
the best chance to stay healthy, and so the 
first Medical Legal Partnership (MLP) was 
born. This MLP was developed in Boston 
in 1993 in collaboration with the Boston 
Medical Center for Pediatrics. 1  
      MLPs are a healthcare and legal ser-
vices delivery model that aims to improve 
the health and well being of vulnerable 
individuals, children and families by inte-
grating legal assistance into the medical 
setting. MLPs address social determinants 
of health and seek to eliminate barriers to 
healthcare in order to help vulnerable 
populations meet their basic needs and 
stay healthy.2 Basic needs include, income 
supports for families, utility shut-off pro-
tection during cold winter months, and 
mold removal from the homes of asth-
matic children.3  
In 2007, the American Bar Association 
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      Dr. Barry Zuckerman, Chief of 
Pediatrics at Boston Medical Cen-
ter, was frustrated about sending 
sick children home to substandard 
apartments only to see them return 
again after having not responded to 
medical treatments. He recognized 
that many of these problems were 
caused by social determinants of 
health, and a lawyer could help pa-
tients navigate the complex legal 
systems that hold solutions. Dr. 
(ABA) passed a resolution that creat-
ed the MLP Support Project (the Pro-
ject).4 Following the ABA’s adoption 
of the project, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) adopted a similar 
model.5 Both programs encourage 
working closely with hospitals and 
health officials and they honor those 
individuals that participate in the 
movement.6 The resolution passed by 
the ABA is modeled after other initia-
tives already in place to promote ser-
vice to vulnerable populations which 
include: public health law generally, 
long term care for HIV/AIDS pa-
tients and breast cancer patients.7 
Within the next few years, the for-
mation of these types of partnerships 
may become critical in the success of 
solving the problems of struggling 
families and individuals. Indeed, given 
(‘Medical Legal Partnerships,’  
Continued on page  15) 
Medical Legal Partnerships 
of support among congressmen, 
this bill has never been passed. 
      Following Congress’ example, 
state governments have enacted 
legislation regarding organ and 
bone marrow donor leave. Twenty-
nine states have enacted laws 
against this form of employer retali-
ation against employees who take 
leave for organ and bone marrow 
donation.6 For example, as of Janu-
ary 1, 2011, California requires em-
ployers, who have 15 or more em-
ployees, to provide at least 30 days 
of paid leave for employees making 
organ donations and up to five days 
of paid leave for employees making 
bone marrow donations.7 All 29 
states require that public employers 
give donor employees paid leave of ab-
sence; however not all require that pri-
vate employers do so. Only Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, 
Minnesota, Nebraska and Oregon require 
or incentivize leave of absence for private 
sector employees.8 If leave is granted, the 
period of leave is usually 30 days for or-
gan donors and five to seven days for 
bone marrow donors.9 
      When a state will not require an em-
ployer to pay its donor employees, it may 
create incentives so that employers 
choose to pay an employee’s leave of 
absence. For example, under Arkansas 
Act No. 2235, private employers are re-
quired to provide, at a minimum, unpaid 
leave of absence; however, the act also 
provides an income tax credit for em-
ployers electing to pay the wages of 
the employee on organ or bone mar-
row donation leave.10 Idaho, Louisi-
ana and Utah have followed this ex-
ample. Similarly, South Carolina has a 
provision which requires employer’s 
authorization for a donor employee’s 
requested leave.11 Indiana and Louisi-
ana prohibit employers from retaliat-
ing against employees from taking 
donor leave.12 
      Other states have created individu-
al incentives for organ donation. 
While many national organizations, 
such as the National  
 
(‘Donor Leave Acts,’ Continued on page 9) 
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‘Overcrowded U.S. Prisons and Mentally Ill Offenders,’ Continued   
aggravating contra-indications; they pro-
duce more mental illness and criminal 
behavior, which impose future costs on 
society.  
      More than 1 in every 100 adults in 
the U.S. is incarcerated.9 Among those 
incarcerated, persons with severe and 
persistent mental illnesses are dispro-
portionately represented.10 It is estimat-
ed that 44.8 to 66.2% of those incarcer-
ated in state prisons, federal prisons, 
and local jails have a mental health 
problem, defined as receiving a clinical 
diagnosis or treatment by a mental 
health professional.11 Additionally, ap-
proximately 14 - 16% of individuals in 
the criminal justice system have a se-
vere mental illness*.12,13 Inmates with 
mental illnesses, like their counter-
parts in the community, have special 
treatment  
*This includes schizophrenia spectrum disor-
ders, bipolar spectrum disorders, and major 
depressive disorders.  
needs and often challenging behaviors 
that can be difficult to manage.14 Psy-
chotic symptoms can include bizarre 
(‘Overcrowded U.S. Prisons and Mentally 
Ill Offenders,’ Continued on page 8) 
unsanitary living conditions, increased 
violence, and increased recidivism.6 
These inhumane conditions instigate 
mental illness in those who are pre-
disposed to or have minor symptoms 
of mental illnesses.7 The former war-
den of San Quentin State Prison and 
Acting Secretary of the California De-
partment of Corrections and Rehabili-
tation testified that the current prison 
conditions in California, “make people 
worse, and…we are not meeting public 
safety by the way we treat people.”8 As 
such, the conditions resulting from 
prison overcrowding have serious and 
‘Penalties for Federal Health Privacy Violations,’ Continued 
I. Overview of Violations that Can Re-
sult in a Penalty  
      The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to 
all covered entities, which include health 
plans, health care clearinghouses, and 
health care providers who transmit pro-
tected health information electronically 
in connection with a standard transac-
tion.7 Once an entity is designated a cov-
ered entity, and thus subject to the Pri-
vacy Rule, that entity must follow strict 
guidelines for uses and disclosures of 
protected health information. Generally, 
a covered entity is permitted to use pro-
tected health information in the follow-
ing circumstances: (1) when giving it to 
the individual (i.e., a patient); (2) for 
treatment, payment, and health care 
operations; (3) when the individual pa-
tient is given the opportunity to accept 
or reject the use/disclosure; (4) with an 
individual’s authorization.8 Outside the 
scope of these parameters, use and dis-
closure of personal health information is 
unauthorized. That is, if any covered 
entity, or individual agent of a covered 
entity, uses or discloses protected health 
information for any other reason than 
as provided (i.e., for unauthorized re-
search or to “snoop” on a celebrity 
patient), HHS may impose penalties.  
II. The HIPAA Penalty Framework  
      The HIPAA penalty framework 
divides penalties into two levels: (1) the 
general penalty and (2) the specific 
penalty. Failure to comply with HIPAA 
regulations can result in civil monetary 
penalties under the general penalty and, 
more harshly, both financial and crimi-
nal penalties under the specific penal-
ty.9  
A. The General Penalty  
      The HIPAA General Penalty dis-
tinguishes between a violator’s mental 
state in determining the penalty severi-
ty. These mental states include, in pro-
gressive order of severity: (1) the viola-
tor did not know (and by exercising 
reasonable diligence would not have 
known) of the violation; (2) the viola-
tion was due to reasonable cause; (3) 
the violation was due to willful neglect; 
(4) the violation was due to willful ne-
PAGE 7 
glect violation and was not corrected.10 
The civil penalty amounts begin at $100 
at the first mental state and increases to 
$1.5 million.11 Although HHS has wide 
discretion in imposing the general penal-
ty for Privacy Rule violations, “A viola-
tion of a provision…due to willful ne-
glect is a violation for which the Secre-
tary [of HHS] is required to impose a 
penalty.”12  
B. The Specific Penalty  
      The HIPAA Specific Penalty like-
wise distinguishes between a violator’s 
mental state in determining the penalty 
severity. Any person who knowingly 
violates HIPAA by “obtain[ing] individ-
ually identifiable health information 
relating to an individual” or by “disclos
[ing] individually identifiable health in-
formation to another person shall be 
punished.”13 A knowing violation of 
HIPAA can result in a  
 (‘Penalties for Federal Health Privacy Viola-
tions,’ Continued on page 9) 
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behavior, delusions, hallucinations, 
problems with consciousness, faulty 
memory, impulsive actions, and uncon-
trollable mood swings.15 Incarcerated 
individuals with mental illness are also 
much more likely to have substance 
abuse problems when compared to 
those incarcerated without mental ill-
ness.16  
       Despite this, inmates with mental 
illnesses are often housed with the gen-
eral population, and the symptoms of 
their illnesses are not taken into account 
in terms of expectations of behavior or 
compliance.17 Indeed, the “acting out” 
behaviors of untreated mental illness are 
often assumed to be volitional or ma-
nipulative.18 Not surprisingly, inmates 
with mental illnesses are more likely 
than the general inmate population to 
serve out their maximum sentence, be 
denied parole, and be placed in adminis-
trative segregation.19 It also costs signifi-
cantly more to incarcerate inmates with 
mental illness than inmates without 
mental illness.20  
       While there is no consensus on 
whether prison is the right place for 
people with mental illnesses who com-
mit crimes, it is clear that they will be a 
significant minority within prison popu-
lations across the country for the fore-
seeable future. 21 During incarceration, 
inmates with mental illnesses are entitled 
to basic sustenance by the state, includ-
ing adequate mental health treatment, 
the deprivation of which results in a 
violation of the 8th Amendment and 
cruel and unusual punishment, remedia-
ble by the court.22 Mental health treat-
ment becomes compromised when pris-
on resources are more strained by over-
crowding. While California’s prison sys-
tem is an extreme example, it represents 
conditions which are pervasive in other 
states. In 2005, the populations at state 
prisons were on average at 114% their 
facilities’ design capacity, with Alabama 
ranking highest at 179%.23  
      The United States incarcerates more 
people per capita than any other country 
in the world and the rate of incarcera-
tion in the US has been increasing at 
annual rates between 8 to 12% since the 
1970’s, outpacing the rate of growth of 
the population.24 The U.S. appetite for 
incarceration has increased in large 
measure as a consequence of tougher 
sentencing laws resulting in lower 
thresholds to become incarcerated, or re
-incarcerated once on probation or pa-
role.25 Examples of this trend in policy 
include laws such as California’s “three 
strikes” measure, mandatory minimum 
sentences, abolishment of discretionary 
release by the parole boards, and requir-
ing probation and parole officers to 
report any violation of an offender’s 
conditional release.26  
      With the expanding girth of 
state correctional systems, fiscal expend-
itures to fund these institutions have 
grown, absorbing substantial portions of 
state budgets. There is evidence, howev-
er, that crime and sentencing policies 
have exceeded the ability of fiscally-
strapped states. Indeed, states like Cali-
fornia have grown their correctional 
systems past the point of their afforda-
bility. And the consequence is over-
crowding and underservicing, which has 
an immediate and devastating impact on 
the most vulnerable population within 
state prisons: inmates with mental ill-
nesses. The Supreme Court’s opinion 
affirms that a limit must be placed on 
the extent to which fiscal constraints 
can be borne by inmates with mental 
illnesses who are guaranteed by law to 
receive adequate and timely mental 
health treatment while incarcerated. 
This provides credence to the continued 
evaluation of the U.S. correctional sys-
tem with the aim of developing in-
formed practices that facilitate offender 
rehabilitation, in part by pruning practic-
es that further exacerbate crime and 
criminal behavior, so that the interests 
of incarcerated individuals and society 
are best protected. ☼ 
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financial penalty of up to $50,000 and a 
prison sentence of up to one year; a 
knowing violation under false pretens-
es can result in a financial penalty of up 
to $100,000 and a prison sentence of 
up to five years; a knowing violation 
with the intent to sell, transfer, or use 
individually identifiable health infor-
mation for commercial advantage, per-
son gain, or malicious harm can result 
in a financial penalty of up to $250,000 
and a prison sentence of up to 10 
years.14 As is evident from the potential 
severity of the financial penalty, coupled 
with the possibility of prison time, the 
specific penalty is much harsher than 
the general penalty.  
C. Limitations to HIPAA General Penalty  
      If HHS determines that imposing 
the general penalty is not a proper reme-
dy for a particular violation, it may opt 
to employ one of the several limitations 
built into the general penalty as a reme-
dial measure. First, if HHS imposes the 
specific penalty, it may not also impose 
the general penalty.15 Second, if a vio-
lation is cured within 30 days of the 
date the person knew, or by exercising 
reasonable diligence should have  
 (‘Penalties for Federal Health Privacy Vio-
lations,’ Continued on page 11) 
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‘Donor Leave Acts,’ Continued  
Transplant Assistance Fund and the 
National Living Donor Assistance 
Center, provide monetary assistance to 
donors, states such as Mississippi, New 
Mexico, and Virginia have legislation in 
place which allows living organ donors 
to deduct as much as $10,000 on their 
state income taxes for travel, lodging 
and lost wages related to the dona-
tion.13 While this is a great benefit to 
many donors and a great incentive to 
potential donors, leave of absence 
from employment will be necessary to 
undergo either procedure, and the dis-
incentive of employer retaliation may 
be too great for many people. Without 
legislation providing otherwise, it is 
extremely difficult to protect employ-
ees from employer retaliation for when 
they take time to participate in and 
recover from organ donation. Since a 
specific cause of action is unavailable 
for organ donors in New Jersey, organ 
donors may look to recover damages 
based on unlawful discharge, such as 
discrimination based on disability. If an 
employee attempts to sue under New 
Jersey’s disability law, they must at-
tempt to hurdle what New Jersey has 
qualified as a disability: a plaintiff suf-
fers from a disability which is caused 
by illness and which includes any de-
gree of amputation.14 Under this reading 
of New Jersey’s disability law, a court 
may find that the term “disability” limits 
itself to individuals who received a nec-
essary amputation due a precondition or 
illness. Therefore, an organ donor em-
ployee attempting to sue under a claim 
of disability would fail; thus, it is clear 
that there needs to be more specific leg-
islation addressing the needs of organ 
donors.  
      Living organ and bone marrow do-
nors are quite the opposite; they are typi-
cally healthy individuals who voluntarily 
have surgery for the benefit of another, 
not as a result of a condition or illness. 
Thus, without a specific provision indi-
cating that donors specifically have a 
cause of action against an employer for 
discriminatory discharge, the donor will 
be unable to prove discrimination. Even 
if she can prove unlawful discharge 
based on her organ donation, there is no 
act prohibiting this form of employer 
retaliation against an organ donor em-
ployee. 
      New Jersey will see many economic 
and social benefits if it adopts a donor 
leave provision. First, the provision 
would encourage and enable many living 
organ donors by providing reassurance 
and job security. Currently, 25% of 
potential living organ donors do not 
donate because of concerns about po-
tential unreimbursed expenses related 
to organ donation, salary reductions or 
potential loss of employment.15 Legis-
lation would prevent employees from 
being fired due to an extended leave of 
absence for recovery from donation.16 
Thus, employees would not have to 
fear retaliation and would be more 
inclined to donate. 
      Encouraging organ donation also is 
cost- effective for society as a whole. 
There are approximately 83,000 people 
on the waiting list for organ and tissue 
transplants, and the list is growing due 
to a chronic shortage of organs.17 Last 
year, only 16,500 people actually re-
ceived an organ.18 Encouraging living 
donors would provide a greater supply 
of organs for transplantation, which in 
turn would decrease time spent on 
dialysis and improve patient and organ 
survival rates.19 There would also be an 
overall savings in health-care  
(‘Donor Leave Acts,’ Continued on page 11) 
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manufacturer making the label changes 
first.19 The Court ultimately held that 
conflict preemption precluded failure-to
-warn lawsuits against generic manufac-
turers, even though their labeling was 
approved by the FDA.20  
      Writing for the majority, Justice 
Thomas held that federal law preempts 
state law since the FDA has interpreted 
its regulations “to require that the warn-
ing labels of a brand-name drug and its 
generic copy [to] always be the same – 
thus, generic drug manufacturers have 
an ongoing federal duty of ‘sameness’ 
”21 to the brand manufacturer’s label. As 
such, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
contentions that the generic manufac-
turers could have unilaterally strength-
ened their warnings under the FDA’s 
changes-being-effected (CBE) process22 
or by sending “Dear Doctor” letters23 to 
physicians. The Court deferred to the 
FDA’s interpretation that the CBE pro-
cess and “Dear Doctor” letters qualify 
as “labeling” and that generic manufac-
turers cannot alter their drug labeling 
without action first by the brand manu-
facturer.24 The FDA’s views are “ 
‘controlling unless plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation[s]’ or [if] 
there is any other reason to doubt that 
they reflect the FDA’s fair and consid-
ered judgment.”25 Accordingly, the 
Court found conflict preemption be-
cause it was impossible for generic drug 
manufacturers to comply with both 
state and federal requirements because 
“if the [generic manufacturers] had inde-
pendently changed their labels to satisfy 
their state-law duty, they would have 
violated federal law.”26  
Foster v. American Home Products Corp.: 
Brand Manufacturers are not Liable  
      Prior to the decision in PLIVA, the 
vast majority of courts which had exam-
ined brand liability for plaintiffs injured 
by a generic manufacturer’s drug aligned 
themselves with the holding in Foster v. 
American Home Products Corp.27 Applying 
Maryland state law, the Foster court af-
firmed the district court’s ruling, which 
held that the brand manufacturer of 
promethazine (Phenergan®) owed no 
duty to warn the recipients of the gener-
ic medication of the dangers associated 
with the drug.28 Essentially, the court 
declared that product liability claims for 
pharmaceuticals can only be brought 
against the manufacturer of the product 
that actually caused the injury to the 
plaintiff.29  
      The Fosters brought suit against the 
brand manufacturer because their 
daughter died from taking the generic 
version of Phenergan®.30 The appellate 
court refused to recognize a cause of 
action against a manufacturer for inju-
ries arising from another manufacturer’s 
product.31 The court explained that 
brand manufacturers have no duty to 
patients who receive generic medica-
tions because those patients have no 
right to rely on the labeling of the brand 
name medication.32 In addition, the 
court noted that even though the Fos-
ters could not hold the brand manufac-
turer liable, they still had a remedy 
against the generic manufacturers.33 
Thus, following the holding in Foster, 
the only manufacturer that can be liable 
for the plaintiff’s injuries was the manu-
facturer who produced the ingested 
drug, even though both the brand and 
generic labels must be exactly the 
same.34 
      However, Foster was decided in 1994, 
seventeen years prior to the PLIVA 
decision.35 Accordingly, the proposed 
remedy of holding generic manufactur-
ers liable articulated in Foster is no long-
er a viable solution. The decision in PLI-
VA has definitively established that 
generic manufacturers cannot be held 
liable under failure-to-warn claims be-
cause federal law preempts state tort 
law.36  
Limitations of Foster  
      The Foster court erred in determin-
ing that it was not foreseeable for a 
brand manufacturer to owe a duty of 
care to the user of a generic medica-
tion.37 The analysis in the Foster decision 
inappropriately focused on the foreseea-
bility of the brand manufacturer owing a 
duty to the plaintiff taking the generic 
drug.38 Instead, “[f]or a duty to arise, the 
question is not whether the defendant 
foresaw owing a particular duty to a 
plaintiff, but rather whether the defend-
ant’s conduct create[d] a foreseeable risk 
to a foreseeable plaintiff.”39 The court in 
Foster ignored this by simply stating that 
it was not foreseeable that a brand man-
ufacturer would owe a duty to the user 
of generic medication.40 The court 
quickly concluded that there is no duty 
of the brand manufacturer because the 
injured plaintiff did not take the brand 
manufacturer’s medication.41 The court 
never addressed the question of whether 
the brand manufacturer’s labeling re-
quirement created a foreseeable risk to 
the patient taking the generic medica-
tion.42  
(‘A Prescription for Change,’  
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expenditures for kidney disease ser-
vices and services for other life-
threatening illnesses. 
      New Jersey is currently considering 
an act that would provide a tax deduc-
tion of up to $10,000 for unreimbursed 
travel expenses, lodging expenses and 
wages lost while recovering from organ 
donation.20 However, even if this act is 
passed, it is not enough; New Jersey 
state legislation is necessary to require 
private and public employers to provide 
a paid leave of absence during testing 
for, donations of, and recovery from 
organ donation. Public policy practically 
necessitates the enactment of a donor 
leave act in New Jersey: legislation 
would increase donation rates and in-
crease the number of organs available; it 
would improve patient survival rates; 
and there would be a saving of health-
care expenditures both on an individual 
and on society as a whole. Thus, New 
Jersey should enact donor leave acts 
for public and private employees. ☼ 
 
‘Penalties for Federal Health Privacy Violations,’ Continued 
known, that the failure to comply oc-
curred, no penalty can be imposed nor 
can any damage be collected.16 Third, 
HHS may, at its discretion, extend the 
30-day cure period.17 Fourth, HHS may 
provide violators with technical assis-
tance to help them come into compli-
ance.18 Fifth, for any penalty that is not 
due to willful neglect, HHS may waive 
the general penalty “to the extent that 
the payment of such penalty would be 
excessive relative to the compliance 
failure involved.”19  
III. HHS Seems to Prefer the General 
Penalty Limitations to Imposing a Pen-
alty  
      HIPAA complaints20 are divided 
into three categories: (1) those that are 
resolved after intake and review (no 
investigation); (2) cases investigated 
and resolved with no finding of a viola-
tion; (3) cases investigated and resolved 
with corrective action obtained from 
the covered entity.21 Under the third 
category, where corrective action is 
obtained from a violating entity, HHS’ 
OCR has not necessarily imposed a 
penalty (or agreed to a settlement). 
OCR often allows violating entities to 
“come into compliance” or take 
“corrective action,” consequently fore-
going the imposition of any civil mone-
tary penalty or criminal liability.22  
      In cases where OCR has permitted a 
violating covered entity to come into 
compliance, it is effectively exercising 
the General Penalty Limitations. For 
example, HHS may grant a violating 
entity an extension to the 30-day cure 
period so that the entity can ensure com-
pliance with the violated regulation(s).23 
Often, “providers who are found to have 
violated the requirements of HIPAA are 
asked to sign a Corrective Action Plan, 
obligating themselves to reporting and 
monitoring responsibilities that more 
resemble a Corporate Integrity Agree-
ment (CIA) than a simple settlement 
agreement.”24 Corrective Action Plans, 
like statutory limitations to penalty, help 
bring violators into compliance, but do 
no actually impose a penalty. In fact, 
since the Privacy Rule’s inception in 
2003, HHS has only collected money 
(either through a civil monetary penalty 
or via settlement) from seven violators.25  
IV. A Private Right of Action: Without 
It, Redress of Past Harms Is Unlikely  
      Because HIPAA does not provide a 
private right of action, aggrieved individ-
uals, whose health privacy has been vio-
lated, cannot pursue a lawsuit against 
the violating party.26 Essentially, pa-
tients substantially affected by medical 
privacy “leaks” are without individual 
rights. The only action they can take is 
to file a complaint with HHS27 and 
hope that HHS will then decide to act 
on the complaint pursuant to its en-
forcement powers. However, under 
this best-case scenario, any penalty 
imposed against the violating party will 
go to the government, not the ag-
grieved individual.28  
      Alternative theories of obtaining 
individual redress for HIPAA viola-
tions have been explored.29 Despite 
these theories, the only solution that 
will appropriately enable the victims of 
medical privacy violations to seek re-
dress against the responsible party is a 
congressional rewriting of the HIPAA 
statute to provide for a private right of 
action. Such a rewriting of HIPAA 
would permit those who have already 
been  
 (‘Penalties for Federal Health Privacy Vio-
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      In addition, the Foster court was mis-
taken in its unstated assumption that 
prescription medications were similar to 
all other manufactured products.43 For 
most consumer goods, the customer has 
a choice between which manufacturers 
they wish to purchase, but with pre-
scription drugs there often is no 
choice.44 The decision is regularly dictat-
ed by the prescribing physician, pharma-
cist, insurance company, or by some 
other external factor that the patient 
cannot control.45 Because of this lack of 
control, it is even more important for 
medication labeling to be uniform. Oth-
erwise, this may lead prescribers and 
patients to believe that there are differ-
ences between the same medications 
produced by different manufacturers, 
when there is in fact no difference. The 
Foster reasoning is also based on the 
misguided belief that generic manufac-
turers may alter a label’s warnings with-
out FDA approval46 and practically ig-
nored the continuing duty of the brand 
manufacturer to maintain the accuracy 
of its labeling.47  
      Therefore, in light of these short-
comings coupled with PLIVA, courts 
should no longer follow the precedent 
established in Foster. PLIVA held that 
generic manufacturers cannot be liable 
for labeling defects because only the 
brand manufacturer can change the la-
beling to reflect new warnings.48 Foster 
held that brand manufacturers cannot 
be liable when a generic drug harms a 
patient because the patient took the 
generic manufacturer’s drug and had no 
right to rely on the representations of 
the brand product.49 Read together, the-
se two cases would leave a patient 
harmed by a generic medication without 
a remedy because neither manufacturer 
could be held accountable. Now that the 
decision in PLIVA definitively estab-
lishes that generic manufacturers must 
rely on the brand manufacturers label-
ing, it shifts responsibility back to the 
brand manufacturers to ensure that their 
labeling adequately reflects new warn-
ings.50 Thus, in order to provide a po-
tential avenue of relief for injured plain-
tiffs, courts must accept the application 
of the innovator liability theory as set 
forth in Conte v. Wyeth.51  
Conte v. Wyeth: Innovator Theory Holds 
Brand Manufacturers are Liable  
      Now that PLIVA has effectively 
ruled out generic manufacturer liabil-
ity,52 plaintiffs are left with the difficult 
task of seeking relief for their injuries. 
The injuries suffered by the plaintiffs 
would not have occurred but for the 
failure of the brand manufacturer to 
adequately warn about the dangers of 
their medication. As a result, brand 
manufacturers must be held accounta-
ble. They are the only entity which can 
update their warning labels to which the 
generic manufacturers must conform.53 
However, this stands as an enormous 
hurdle for plaintiffs because in twenty-
two states that have addressed the issue, 
only one decision out of fifty-two54 has 
found that brand name drug manufac-
turers are potentially liable for the inade-
quate warnings of its drug when the 
plaintiff was harmed by a generic equiv-
alent.55 Nevertheless, in light of the 
Court’s decision in PLIVA, two conclu-
sions necessarily follow. The first is that 
“Congress intended the name brand 
drug manufacturer to bear the sole bur-
den of coping with incipient risks…and 
[second], that Congress intended either 
that the name brand manufacturer be 
liable for all failure-to-warn claims – 
even those arising out of the use of ge-
neric substitutes – or, that the injured 
plaintiff be left with no remedy.”56 It 
would be unjust to allow plaintiffs 
harmed by pharmaceuticals to be left 
without a remedy against the manufac-
turer responsible for the injury. Thus, 
Congressional intent strengthens the 
validity of the Conte decision and further 
supports the application of the innova-
tor liability theory.  
      The decision in Conte represents a 
novel approach for plaintiffs seeking 
relief from their injuries, especially now 
in the wake of PLIVA. In the decision, 
Justice Siggins invokes the theory of 
innovator liability, which established 
that brand name manufacturers owe a 
duty to convey accurate prescribing in-
formation about a medication’s risk and 
benefits to patients who consume a ge-
neric version of the drug. 57 In Conte, the 
plaintiff developed tardive dyskinesia 
after her long-term use of the generic 
drug metoclopramide to treat her acid 
reflux.58 Invoking the theory of innova-
tor liability, the court found that the 
brand manufacturer owed a duty to 
Conte because it was foreseeable that 
generic manufacturers would copy the 
brand drug’s labeling and that pharma-
cists would fill the prescription for the 
generic equivalent.59 
      Furthermore, the court emphasized 
its decision was “rooted in common 
sense” by recognizing that the brand 
manufacturer should not escape liability 
just because Conte happened to receive 
the generic drug.60 The court acknowl-
edged that its decision was contrary to 
the majority of courts which have been 
presented with the issue.61 However, the 
court stressed that its holding was based 
in large part on the foreseeability that 
patients taking a generic drug could be 
injured as a result of their reliance on 
the brand manufacturer’s product label-
ing.62  The fact “that Wyeth did not 
(‘A Prescription for Change,’  
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even the implementation of new, stricter 
workforce training and accountability 
standards, will not help to redress harms 
already done.  
      HHS must also be more willing to 
impose the specific penalty on violators 
and thereby seek enhanced penalties. In 
2010 the first ever prison sentence was 
imposed on a HIPAA violator for unau-
thorized access of patient medical rec-
ords.34 While jail time, and application 
of the specific penalty in general, should 
remain reserved for the most egregious 
violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 
HHS should more frequently seek incar-
ceration as a penalty when patient health 
information is improperly accessed, 
used or disclosed. That is, incarceration 
should be a penalty reserved for instanc-
es when a covered entity, or its agent, 
knowingly violates an individual’s pro-
tected health information. The possibil-
ity of jail time could serve as a powerful 
warning and deterrent to those who 
consider illegally accessing patient medi-
cal information. While the recently im-
posed penalties have encouraged some 
to argue that increased HIPAA enforce-
ment will become the norm,35 HHS has 
not yet done enough. The massive 
HIPAA Privacy Rule was enacted to 
help protect individual personal health 
information. HHS must ensure that 
those protections are safeguarded.  
VI. Regardless of Enforcement Levels, 
Workforce Training and Accountability 
Are Key  
      While aggressive enforcement of the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule is necessary, in-
cluding the increased imposition of pen-
alties on violators, covered entities can 
nonetheless contemporaneously mitigate 
their chances of being penalized and 
protect individual health information. 
The easiest way to do this is through 
strict workforce training and workforce 
the victims of medical privacy “leaks” to 
seek remedy for the wrong they suf-
fered. However, while congressional 
rewriting is possible, it is highly unlikely 
given the overwhelmingly burdensome 
litigation and increased health care costs 
that would likely ensue.30 Whereas the 
HIPAA statute is unable, as currently 
construed, to redress past health privacy 
violations, HHS can, and thus should, 
focus on preventing future harms.  
V. Where Should HHS Go From Here?  
      In 2011, thus far, HHS has vastly 
increased its enforcement of HIPAA 
Privacy Rule violations. HHS has im-
posed its first-ever civil monetary penal-
ty, and, moreover, has settled with two 
additional violators.31 Some have argued 
that this increased enforcement of pen-
alties has sent a message to current (and 
potential) violators.32 But it is not 
enough. Public policy dictates that HHS’ 
OCR not only require violators to 
“come into compliance” whether 
through corrective action plans or by 
other means, but also impose a penalty 
against violators. This does not mean 
that HHS should not help violators on 
the road to compliance. That is, HHS 
must require compliance, providing vio-
lators with assistance when feasible, in 
order to protect private health infor-
mation in the future. The imposition of 
civil monetary penalties, and criminal 
penalties in extreme cases, will conceiva-
bly help to deter future violations. While 
the imposition of these penalties will 
not remedy past violations, because of 
HIPAA’s exclusion of an individual 
cause of action,33 previously compro-
mised individuals can take some solace 
in knowing that HHS is actively working 
to prevent future harms. A mere prom-
ise to aggrieved individuals that improp-
er use or disclosure of personal health 
information will not again occur, or 
accountability.36 Only if covered entities 
implement required administrative re-
quirements, namely workforce training 
and sanctions, can they hope to prevent 
their employee’s improper access, use 
and disclosure of personal health infor-
mation. Essentially, covered entities 
must strive to make all employees atten-
tive to HIPAA Privacy Rule regulations 
and, moreover, must be willing to en-
force internal sanctions against violators 
of those regulations.37 Proper workforce 
training and a strict demand of account-
ability will likely decrease the potential 
of Privacy Rule violations, while, at the 
same time, personal health information 
will be protected.  
      Altogether, the proscribed penalties 
for HIPAA violations, the lack of an 
individual right of action, and HHS’ 
haphazard imposition of penalties 
against violators have resulted in a cha-
otic system that neither redresses previ-
ous harms nor adequately protects 
against future harms. To “fix the sys-
tem,” so to speak, HHS must aggres-
sively enforce penalties against HIPAA 
Privacy Rule violators. Such enforce-
ment is the only means to systematically 
deter future health privacy violations. 
Because no private right of action cur-
rently exists, and such a right is unlikely 
to be written into the statute, direct re-
course for already aggrieved individuals 
is unlikely. However, if HHS takes 
HIPAA Privacy Rule enforcement seri-
ously and covered entities work earnest-
ly to implement strict workforce training 
and accountability, previously aggrieved 
individuals can, at the very least, have 
some relief from knowing that future 
violations are less likely to occur. ☼ 
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court’s evaluation of Hinckley’s mental 
state quickly devolved into a “war of 
the experts.”4 The defense’s psychiatrist 
diagnosed Hinckley with various men-
tal disorders directly impacting volition, 
and therefore his culpability, while the 
prosecution’s expert concluded that 
Hinckley was not suffering from a dis-
order serious enough to impair his deci-
sion-making capacity.5 Both psychia-
trists shared similar medical training, 
yet they arrived at contradictory diag-
nostic conclusions. 
      A potential explanation for this 
outcome is discussed by Harvard Medi-
cal School professor Marcia Angell in 
an article primarily focused on the in-
terplay between the clinical diagnosis of 
mental disorder and the development 
of drugs for the treatment of those 
disorders.6 According to Angell, before 
the advent of psychoactive drugs, the 
psychiatric profession subscribed to the 
Freudian approach to mental disor-
ders.7 Nearly all known mental disor-
ders were treated with a strict regimen 
of “talk therapy,” a treatment arising 
out of the Freudian concept that the 
root of the disorder was within the pa-
tient’s mind.8  
      By the 1950’s, the use of Thorazine 
and other tranquilizers became com-
monplace in the treatment of both seri-
ous depression and schizophrenia.9 
These drugs, originally used for the 
treatment of epilepsy, infections, and 
other non-mental disorder conditions, 
became popular after it was noticed 
that one of their secondary effects was 
a significant decrease in symptoms re-
lated to depression and schizophrenia.10 
Researchers and clinicians then postu-
lated that, because these drugs affected 
the brain’s serotonin reuptake mecha-
‘Punishment, Prevention, Protection and the Challenge of 
Diagnosing Mental Disorders,’ Continued 
nism, depression must be related to 
serotonin levels.11 Later drugs like Pro-
zac, known generally as Selective Sero-
tonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), 
were developed to specifically target 
the nervous system’s levels of seroto-
nin, in the belief that the cause of de-
pression was a serotonin imbalance.12 
Both the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation and the major pharmaceutical 
companies ultimately concluded that, 
because SSRIs specifically targeted the 
brain’s serotonin reuptake process, 
depression must be the result of too 
little serotonin.13 Since serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors were shown to have 
the secondary effect of reducing symp-
toms of depression, Angell argues that 
drug companies and clinical psychia-
trists effectively reverse-engineered a 
drug for depression (the pharmacologi-
cal treatment for schizophrenia had a 
very similar genesis).14 In essence, con-
cluding that depression and schizo-
phrenia are the result of imbalances in 
serotonin is analogous to claiming that 
the sensation of physical pain is the 
result of too little aspirin or acetamino-
phen in the nervous system.15  
     According to Angell, there have 
been no subsequent studies supporting 
the thesis that depression and schizo-
phrenia are solely the result of either 
too little serotonin or too much dopa-
mine, yet this idea has become the pre-
vailing scientific explanation for both 
disorders.16 The American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) and the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (DSM) both 
refer to depression and schizophrenia 
as disorders caused by a chemical im-
balance, despite recent studies showing 
that treatment with SSRIs actually caus-
es imbalances in patients that had no 
chemical imbalance before the treat-
ment.17 Dr. Angell’s description of the 
development of pharmaceutical treat-
ments for depression and schizophre-
nia illustrates the difficulties facing the 
mental health profession as the diag-
nostic process is developed and refined. 
These developmental difficulties, spe-
cifically those effecting diagnosis of 
mental disorder, have serious implica-
tions for criminal defendants whose 
level of culpability may be determined 
by such a diagnosis.  
      A “battle of the experts,” in which 
two equally trained and qualified clini-
cians reach contradictory conclusions, 
seems unavoidable when the develop-
ment of diagnoses and treatments for 
major mental disorders is founded on a 
reverse-engineering process unsupport-
ed by empirical studies. At least in the 
context of diagnosing depression and 
schizophrenia, clinicians are forced to 
rely on a process that does not seem to 
rise to the level of proof required by 
the criminal justice system. This  
(‘Punishment, Prevention, Protection and the 
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the success in both patient outcomes 
and the ability to save institutions mon-
ey on emergency costs, it seems very 
likely that MLPs will become and indis-
pensible tool to fight against social de-
terminants of health.  
      MLPs are important because tradi-
tional health and legal services treat indi-
viduals in isolation from each other, 
resulting in a system where people can 
fall through the cracks. The MLP model 
bridges this divide by focusing on giving 
individual patients the comprehensive 
care that they need.8 There is fluidity to 
the organization of these various mod-
els. MLPs vary in size and scope, but are 
comprised of at least one legal institu-
tion and one healthcare institution in the 
community.9 Successful MLPs establish 
and maintain active engagement of key 
leaders at every level, from front lines to 
administration, in both the healthcare 
and legal partner institutions. Legal staff 
are present at the healthcare institution 
on a regular basis.10 Working together, 
healthcare and legal teams devise strate-
gies for efficient referrals, joint data 
collection and monitoring, and fundrais-
ing to ensure high quality patient-
centered care in the medical home.11  
      The current national model, as laid 
out by the National Center for Medical 
Legal Partnerships, focuses on three 
core components: (1) direct service for 
patients and families, (2) training for 
healthcare staff, and (3) joint medical-
legal systems and policy change and 
advocacy.12  Direct service in the 
healthcare setting focuses on legal pro-
fessionals becoming members of the 
healthcare team to assist patients with 
legal issues, such as unhealthy housing 
conditions. This ensures timely access to 
assistance. Training and practice trans-
formation allows the MLPs to reorient 
health and legal services to include early 
detection and preventive care through 
training and education of all health care 
staff, including: medical students, resi-
dents, nurses, social workers and prac-
ticing physicians. It also allows the MLP 
teams to improve institutional practices 
and to address legal needs, such as es-
tablishing a hospital policy regarding 
low-income utility protections. Finally, 
policy change and advocacy involves the 
use of MLP teams to leverage health 
and legal expertise to improve local, 
state and federal laws and regulations 
that impact the health of vulnerable 
populations. The goal is to find a system 
wide solution to improve health.  
      The major source of startup funding 
for most MLPs is private non-
governmental grant money from the 
National MLP Organization (the Na-
tional Organization). New MLPs can 
gain access to this money through the 
National Organization’s website, which 
includes documents for creating a budg-
et and applying for grants. The National 
Organization usually distributes startup 
funds to MLPs that are trying some-
thing novel or performing research on 
the benefits of MLPs.13 Governmental 
grants are becoming more rare as the 
idea of MLPs is becoming better known 
and more widespread. A report pub-
lished by the National Organization 
showed that MLPs receive less than 4% 
of their funding through governmental 
resources, with the majority of funding 
‘Medical Legal Partnerships,’ Continued 
for continuing the work of the MLP 
coming from private donations.14 
With these startup funds, MLPs are 
able to start building a model that 
connects with all the needs of their 
patients.  
      Patients report that after their 
encounter with a MLP they feel more 
empowered, their stress level is re-
duced, and they experience an im-
provement in their general health. 
There is a relationship between pa-
tients’ stress levels and being under 
the care of a MLP; Patients reported 
that the decrease in concern over 
dealing with legal issues related to 
their illness allowed them to give 
more attention to their treatments and 
increased their quality of life.15  
      A pilot study in done in 2010 
found that patients also reported a 
general improvement in their health 
after taking advantage of MLPs.16 
This pilot study suggests that the ad-
dition of a legal aid attorney to the 
medical team can increase access to 
legal and social services and decrease 
barriers to health care.17  Of particular 
promise were increased awareness and 
use of free legal services, increased 
access to food and income supports, 
decreased barriers to health care and 
reported improvement in child health 
and well-being. The study also noted a 
decreased frequency of hospitaliza-
tions but did not draw conclusions, as 
the study did not focus on infor-
mation on indications for hospitaliza-
tion.18 Overall the study demonstrated 
high participant satisfaction with inte-
gration of legal services in the clinical 
setting.19 Health care facilities also 
reported high level of satisfaction 
with the integration of health and 
legal service.  
(Continued on page 17) 
“PATIENTS REPORT THAT AFTER 
THEIR ENCOUNTER WITH A 
MEDICAL LEGAL PARTNERSHIP 
THEY FEEL MORE EMPOWERED, 
THEIR STRESS LEVEL IS RE-
DUCED, AND THEY EXPERIENCE 
AN IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR 
GENERAL HEALTH.”  
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‘Punishment, Prevention, Protection and the Challenge of 
Diagnosing Mental Disorders,’ Continued 
imprecision constitutes a significant 
threat to the legitimacy of the court’s 
system of confinement, commitment, 
or punishment.18 If a defendant’s men-
tal status—which directly relates to her 
culpability—may only be determined 
by the flawed processes outlined above, 
the court’s decision becomes vulnerable 
to challenges on fairness and equal 
treatment under the law.19 Psychiatry, 
like any science, constantly undergoes 
change and modification, but the impli-
cations that arise from this evolution 
have repercussions for individuals fac-
ing a potential loss of freedom now.  
      David Eagleman discusses these 
challenges in his article on new devel-
opments in brain imaging and its im-
pact on criminal sentencing.20 Eagle-
man focuses on the improvements 
made in identifying parts of the brain 
that influence and determine behavior 
and personality, and argues that these 
imaging technologies will eventually 
allow judges and juries to assess an in-
dividual’s culpability, volition, and even 
propensity for recidivism.21 He argues 
that courts will no longer be forced to 
rely on statistical predictions or the 
opinion of a mental health expert.22 
The imaging technology would render 
an empirical judgment on the defend-
ant’s culpability, effectively removing 
the court’s burden of determining the 
defendant’s mental status. This new 
level of objectivity would dramatically 
reduce the fairness concerns raised by 
expert testimony and more traditional 
clinical diagnosis.23 Though this argu-
ment raises difficult questions about 
free will and determinism, it does ad-
dress the central issue now facing both 
the courts and the mental health pro-
fession: how best to make a meaningful 
diagnosis of mental disorders affecting 
an individual’s ability to interact with 
and participate in society.  
      The technology discussed by Pro-
fessor Eagleman is still in the develop-
mental stages, and would likely take a 
substantial amount of time for the 
criminal court system—as well as the 
American people—to accept and as-
similate its implications, especially 
those concerning free will. Acceptance 
of the new technology would be predi-
cated upon an absence of concern over 
imprecision and possible misdiagnosis, 
which so hampers clinical practioners 
now. Other legal scholars have offered 
alternatives to the “battle of the ex-
perts” approach, most notably Profes-
sor Stephen Morse’s argument that 
juries alone should measure and judge a 
defendant’s “craziness” (Morse’s term 
for socially unacceptable behavior) in 
relation to the general population.24 For 
Morse, only juries are capable of deter-
mining how far outside the realm of 
acceptable or normal conduct a defend-
ant has gone.25 In deciding whether the 
defendant’s actions were “crazy,” the 
jury determines the defendant’s mental 
status.26 Yet this approach carries the 
same risks of unfairness and lack of 
legitimacy that the “battle of the ex-
perts” model does. It is neither objec-
tive nor empirical. It would seem that 
until the advent of brain imaging tech-
nology that explicitly measures culpabil-
ity and volition, we are left with a fairly 
imprecise, and potentially unfair, meth-
od of dealing with mental disorders. ☼ 
‘A Prescription for Change,’ Continued 
manufacture or sell the metoclo-
pramide Conte ingested [did] not re-
lieve Wyeth from its general duty to use 
due care in disseminating product in-
formation”63 to patients who could 
foreseeably be harmed by their reliance 
on the brand manufacturer’s infor-
mation. In light of industry practice, 
where the brand manufacturer provides 
all the labeling information, and in the 
aftermath of the PLIVA decision, the 
holding in Conte could seemingly apply 
to all failure-to-warn cases in which the 
plaintiff took the generic version of a 
drug.64 Therefore, the Conte decision 
may ultimately turn out to be much 
more influential as plaintiffs seek to 
invoke the theory of innovator liability 
as a way of holding the brand manufac-
turers liable. 
Critics of the Conte Decision are Mis-
taken  
      Critics of the Conte decision fail to 
properly understand the critical distinc-
tion the court made between product 
liability and strict liability.65  
 (‘A Prescription for Change,’  
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‘Medical Legal Partnerships,’ Continued 
      Preliminary evidence shows that 
MLPs help reduce barriers to care in the 
medical home and help institutions that 
serve indigent populations. With a MLP, 
these institutions, obtain more reim-
bursement for the care they provide 
while helping people meet their legal 
needs.20 Receiving this reimbursement 
makes the creation of MLPs financially 
attractive to health care facilities and 
could help to lower operating costs.  
      Another benefit that is evident to 
health care facilities is the utilization of 
health care recovery dollars. Health care 
recovery dollars are funds reimbursed to 
hospitals as a result of a successful ap-
peal of improperly denied Medicaid or 
Social Security Disability application.21 
Normally, when a hospital has treated 
an uninsured individual whose applica-
tion for public health insurance has 
been denied, the hospital will remain 
unpaid for those services provided.22  
      Yet if a legal service organization 
can help that individual successfully 
appeal his or her Medicaid denial, the 
hospital can then re-bill Medicaid for 
the services rendered since the initial 
date of application (and oftentimes be-
fore) and be reimbursed for the 
healthcare provided to that now-insured 
patient.23 In this way, the legal services 
provided have a direct financial impact 
on the hospital; legal aid organizations 
become moneymaking partners with 
their medical counterparts. While the 
advocates’ goal is to benefit the client, 
his or her advocacy work directly en-
riches the medical center “on the back 
end.”24 Health care recovery dollars 
projects capitalize on that back end ben-
efit to create a business partnership with 
the hospital.25  
      Within this program model, hospi-
tals identify which of their patients have 
applied for and been denied Medicaid or 
other public health insurance and bene-
fits programs. They use various referral 
systems to direct those patients to the 
legal organization, which has an office 
or set office hours within the hospital. 
The legal services organization process-
es high numbers of appeals cases, care-
fully tracking which clients’ appeals have 
been granted and the amount of medical 
debt that each client is considered to 
owe to the hospital.26 As part of any 
medical debt case, the advocate’s job is 
to contact the hospital billing depart-
ment, alert them that the client is now 
insured, and demand that the billing 
department stop billing the client and 
instead re-bill Medicaid.27  
      It is important to note that the mod-
el could work backwards as well: medi-
cal-legal partnership programs that fo-
cus on other areas of law could begin to 
incorporate a large number of Medicaid 
and Supplemental Security Income ap-
peals cases into their repertoire, track 
the benefit to their partner medical insti-
tutions, and then use that financial data 
to argue for a shift in the character of 
their relationship with their partner 
medical institution. For a program that 
already exists, there is little need to 
change forms, etc., because telling the 
hospital that the client is now insured is 
part of representing the client; it’s neces-
sary to get the bills re-sent to Medicaid. 
All that is different in this model is that 
one is claiming credit for the money 
coming in, and having the hospital track 
the benefits that an individual has been 
getting for them all along.  
      What started as a small idea between 
one doctor and one lawyer in 1993 has 
turned into a movement that cannot be 
ignored. The benefits for patients and 
healthcare providers alike are immense. 
Given the current changes in our health 
care system and a desire to drive down 
costs, this is a viable option to address 
the problems of excess spending within 
the system. MLPs require further mone-
tary and ABA support because they tru-
ly are able to generate better patient 
outcomes and lower costs to hospitals, 
presenting to viable solution to the cur-
rent state of health care within the Unit-
ed States. ☼ 
 
“PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE 
SHOWS THAT MLPS HELP RE-
DUCE BARRIERS TO CARE IN 
THE MEDICAL HOME AND 
HELP INSTITUTIONS THAT 
SERVE INDIGENT POPULA-
TIONS.” 
‘A Prescription for Change,’ Continued 
Product liability claims require proof of 
negligence while strict liability claims do 
not require such evidence.66 Strict liabil-
ity applies only to the manufacturer and 
to the sellers that place the allegedly 
defective product on the market,67 but 
the decision in Conte does not challenge 
this proposition in any way.68 The court 
expressly stated that strict liability can-
not apply to a brand manufacturer when 
the plaintiff took the generic form of 
the drug produced by a different manu-
facturer.69 Justice Siggins articulated that 
“[n]egligence and strict products liability 
are separate and distinct bases for liabil-
ity that do not automatically collapse 
into each other”70 merely because the 
plaintiff was able to assert both claims.71 
When a plaintiff’s claim of strict liability 
fails, it does not preclude the plaintiff 
from asserting other forms of liability. 
Rather, the principles of tort liability 
apply which provide that defendants 
who caused foreseeable harm can be 
held liable for their negligence.72 Conse-
quently, even though a brand manufac-
turer cannot be held strictly liable for 
the harm to patients who took its gener-
ic equivalent, the manufacturer can po-
tentially be liable if it was negligent in 
failing to adequately warn the patient 
through its labeling.73 The brand manu-
gence when its actions were a significant 
cause of a plaintiff’s injury is fair. The 
harm suffered by the plaintiff would 
have been the same regardless if they 
received the brand or generic medica-
tion. It would be unjust to punish the 
patient simply for receiving the generic, 
rather than the brand version of the 
drug. Rather, the injustice of allowing 
brand manufacturers to claim immunity 
from the injuries caused by generic 
drugs is remarkably severe in the sense 
that it would mean no drug manufactur-
er would be legally responsible.82  
Limitations and Defenses to Conte  
      Nevertheless, the decision in Conte is 
not without its limitations. First, Conte 
was decided on summary judgment and 
not at trial. Accordingly, the court stated 
that policy implications, such as the 
“burdens, societal consequences, cost, 
and insurance implications” were not 
fully explored.83 Hence, the broader 
consequences of duty could not be con-
sidered and it was left up to the jury to 
ultimately determine Wyeth’s liability.84  
      In addition, brand manufacturers 
may attempt to avoid liability by assign-
ing the rights of the medication to the 
generic competitor once the brand pa-
tent expires.85 In theory, the brand man-
ufacturer would be assigning away its 
liability and responsibility to continually 
update the drug labeling.86 The respon-
sibility to update the labeling would then 
fall squarely on the shoulders of the 
generic manufacturer.87 However, this 
tactic will prove difficult  
 (‘A Prescription for Change,’  
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facturer is not being blamed for produc-
ing the generic drug; rather, the manu-
facturer is being held liable because it 
was negligent in failing to adequately 
warn the patient through its labeling.74  
      Moreover, the critics of Conte have 
incorrectly insisted on the unfairness of 
the decision since brand manufacturers 
have no control over the drugs pro-
duced by the generic companies.75 While 
this is true of the actual product, it is 
not true about the product labeling.76 
All of a drug’s information is derived 
from the brand manufacturer and they 
are the only manufacturer that can up-
date or change a medication’s labeling.77 
Brand manufacturers can readily foresee 
that generic companies will imitate their 
drugs, and through the FDA, the brand 
manufacturers can force the generic 
companies to conform to the brand’s 
labeling requirements.78 In fact, this is 
the cornerstone of federal law which 
requires generic manufacturers to ensure 
that their labeling exactly match the 
brand drug’s labeling.79  
      The Supreme Court in PLIVA spe-
cifically held that generic manufacturers 
cannot unilaterally change their labeling 
and must always conform to the brand’s 
labeling.80 Thus, the only avenue for a 
generic manufacturer to change their 
labeling to reflect new warnings is to 
have the brand manufacturer first 
change its labeling. The brand manufac-
turers have complete control over the 
labeling requirements because they dic-
tate the information that can be on the 
generic label. For example, if a “plaintiff 
took a generic drug, the brand-name 
manufacturer will not be subject to strict 
liability; it will be liable only if it failed to 
use reasonable care in…crafting the 
drug’s warnings, instructions, or promo-
tional statements.”81 Therefore, holding 
the brand manufacturer liable for negli-
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“AN EXPANSION OF CONTE 
COULD HAVE THE NEGATIVE 
EFFECT OF DETERRING THE 
BRAND MANUFACTURERS 
FROM DEVELOPING NEW 
DRUGS, AS WELL AS REDUC-
ING THE INCENTIVE OF GE-
NERIC MANUFACTURERS TO 
ENSURE THE CONTINUED 
SAFETY OF THEIR OWN 
DRUGS.” 
‘A Prescription for Change,’ Continued 
in practice because it is very unlikely 
that the FDA would permit such assign-
ments.88 Also, the assignment of liability 
may limit the prospective labeling issues 
for the brand manufacturer, but it 
would not necessarily protect the brand 
manufacturer from negligence claims 
arising prior to any assignment.89 Such 
an argument would be contrary to law 
and against the public policy of promot-
ing safe and effective medications.90 The 
generic manufacturer would also insist 
on an indemnification clause since all of 
the data regarding the drug was collect-
ed by the brand manufacturer.91 After 
the PLIVA decision, FDA regulations 
clearly set forth that a generic manufac-
turer cannot unilaterally change its drugs 
labeling; the change must first be done 
by the brand manufacturer.92 This in 
effect frustrates the reasoning behind 
the brand manufacturer assigning away 
the rights to their drug.  
      Lastly, to protect itself from liability, 
the brand manufacturer may consider 
voluntarily withdrawing their drug from 
the market at the end of the exclusivity 
period.93 The reasoning behind this tac-
tic is that the generic manufacturers 
would then have no labeling to copy 
and no information to rely upon and 
thus could not market the drug.94 How-
ever, the Hatch-Waxman Act anticipat-
ed this and provided an exception which 
would allow generic manufacturers to 
continue to market the generic version 
as long as the original drug was not 
withdrawn for safety and efficacy rea-
sons.95 Thus, the withdrawal of the 
brand manufacturer’s medication does 
not necessarily prevent generic manu-
facturers from continuing to market 
their generic equivalent.96  
Conclusion  
      As the number of available generic 
medications on the market continues to 
rise,97 the Court’s decision in PLIVA 
will have broad ramifications for brand 
manufacturers and the public. While the 
decision in Conte represents one critical 
approach to assigning liability to brand 
manufacturers, it must be noted that 
imposing liability on drug manufacturers 
deserves a cautious and thorough analy-
sis by the courts.98 An expansion of 
Conte could have the negative effect of 
deterring the brand manufacturers from 
developing new drugs, as well as reduc-
ing the incentive of generic manufactur-
ers to ensure the continued safety of 
their own drugs.99  
      Brand manufacturers develop enor-
mously valuable products that benefit 
modern medicine, and tort law must not 
go too far towards discouraging the in-
novation of new drugs.100 If every indi-
vidual harmed by a generic medication 
was allowed to bring suit against the 
brand manufacturer, it would be disas-
trous for the drug industry. This risks 
driving brand manufacturers from the 
market and the search for safer and 
more effective pharmaceuticals would 
be hindered. On the other hand, phar-
maceutical companies have been held 
responsible for serious drug disasters in 
the past, such as with Diethylstilbestrol 
(DES) and thalidomide, and tort liability 
is one safeguard to protect against the 
reoccurrence of such events.101  
      While twenty-two states have al-
ready addressed the question of brand 
liability and sided with the Foster court, 
the majority of the states have yet to 
determine the issue.102 Especially after 
PLIVA, state courts now faced with the 
matter may increasingly turn to the rea-
soning in Conte and the theory of inno-
vator liability. To date, the FDA’s regu-
latory oversight has proven ineffective 
in preventing dangerous drugs from 
coming to market and tort law provides 
vital incentives for drug manufacturers 
to act with the appropriate care.103 Strik-
ing the right balance between encourag-
ing drug manufacturers to continue to 
produce innovative products and yet 
also ensure that their products are ac-
companied by adequate warnings is a 
difficult task the courts must strive to 
meet.104  ☼ 
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Information Privacy Complaint Form, available at http://
www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/complaints/hipcomplaintform.pdf. 
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Secretary to impose civil and criminal sanctions on those who blatant-
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deters future violations – it does nothing to compensate those patients 
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ized disclosures.” Joshua D.W. Collins, Toothless HIPAA: Searching for a 
Private Right of Action to Remedy Privacy Rule Violations, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 199. 232 (2007).  
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complaints/hipcomplaintform.pdf.  
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